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CUBA'S PERFECCIONAMIENTO EMPRESARIAL LAW: A
STEP TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION?
MATIAS F TRAVIESO-DIAZ*
1 INTRODUCTION
On August 18, 1998, Cuba enacted Law-Decree No 187 ("Law
187") 1 This law provides the framework for Cuba's Enterprise
Optimization (Perfeccionamiento Empresarial) Program ("BOP") 2
The program seeks to establish a foundation and to set specific
guidelines for a process whose goal is to improve efficiency and
productivity in Cuba's state-owned enterprises ("SOEs")
Cuban sources describe Law 187's intent as improving the na-
tional economy through the enhanced efficiency of the SOEs, al-
ways in the context of continued state ownership and state control
over the enterprises 3 Notwithstanding Cuba's intent to retain
state ownership of the SOEs, it is of interest to the future develop-
ment of the Cuban economy to determine whether, as a practical
matter, the law constitutes a meaningful first step towards what
some believe is the inevitable privatization of Cuban SOEs 4
This Article seeks to address this question To assist in the
analysis, the Article compares Cuba's BOP with steps taken in the
early stages of the privatization programs of some other countries
* Partner, Shaw Pittman LLP (Washington, D C); J D, 1976, Columbia Uni-
versity; PhlD, 1971, Ohio State University; MS, 1967, B S, 1966, University of
Miami The Author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Luis Marini, Char-
les P Trumbull IV, and Sima Chowdhury in the research and preparation of this
Article
I Law Decree No 187 of Aug 25, 1998, p 758, 45 Gaceta Oficial (Cuba)
[hereinafter Law 187]
2 The literal translation of "perfeccionamiento empresarial" is "enterprise per-
fecting"
3 See Fidel Vascos Gonzalez, Upgrading State Enterprises, 59 CUBAN Rsv 5, 5
(Apr 2000) [hereinafter Vascos], available at http://www globalreflexion org
/cubanrev/CR59/ en/CR_05 html
4 See, e g, MATIAS TRAvIEsO-DIAZ, THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-
MARKEr CUBA ch 6 (1996)
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that have undertaken, to some degree or another, the privatization
of SOEs. Thus, Section 2 of the Article provides a summary of the
actions that are generally required to prepare an SOE for its priva-
tization. Section 3 describes the genesis, framework and current
status of the EOP. Section 4 presents a summary of the actions
taken by the governments of China and former East Germany in
the early stages of their respective privatization programs. Those
countries were selected because they represent opposite poles in
the range of potential approaches to SOE privatization. Section 5
compares Cuba's EOP with the methods adopted by the compari-
son countries to determine whether Cuba's EOP is consistent with
the processes utilized elsewhere in moving towards privatization.
Finally, Section 6 offers the Author's conclusions as to whether the
EOP is a meaningful step towards the implementation of a privati-
zation program in Cuba.
2. STEPS IN PREPARING AN ENTERPRISE FOR PRIVATIZATION
This Section provides, as necessary background to the discus-
sion that follows, a brief summary of the actions that are generally
required to prepare an SOE for privatization. The discussion does
not include addressing external conditions, such as outstanding
judgments, liens or claims against the enterprise. Clearly, such
"clouds on the title" of the state to the enterprise need to be re-
moved before the SOE can be sold. In the case of Cuba, a factor
that may complicate the prospects for privatization is the existence
of a large number of claims by U.S. nationals, Cuban Americans,
and Cubans living in the island for the expropriation of their assets
after the Cuban Revolution.5 Cuba has failed to compensate any of
these groups, and thus they all have outstanding claims against the
state, and may seek restitution of the confiscated assets in lieu of
compensation or other remedies.6 The outstanding expropriation
5 See, e.g., Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settle-
ment of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 659 (1996); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Legal and Practical Issues in Resolving
Expropriation Claims, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1996, at 55; Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some
Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Expropriation Claims
Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 217 (1995).
6 Cuba may need, for political reasons, to provide comparable remedies to
claimants living on the island with those given to Americans and Cubans living
abroad. See, e.g., Rolando H. Castafieda & George P. Montalvdn, Economic Factors
in Selecting an Approach to Confiscation Claims in Cuba, 5 CUBA IN TRANsmoN 227,
236-37 (1995), available at http://anic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5
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claims must be addressed early in Cuba's transition to a free-
market society in order, not only to make possible the privatization
of SOEs, but also to restore full relations with the United States, to
foster political stability, and to encourage foreign investment. To
the extent that any expropriation claims are resolved through res-
titution of the assets to their former owners, privatization of those
properties will automatically occur.
A frequently used privatization technique is to sell the SOE as
an ongoing concern. Frequently, however, SOEs cannot be sold on
an "as is" basis, and privatizing them may require a wide array of
preparatory restructuring measures. These measures seek the
transformation and reorganization of poorly performing SOEs into
profitable, self-sufficient business concerns that may be attractive
investments for the private sector. 7 In most cases a necessary pre-
paratory action is that "a feasibility study should be conducted to
determine whether the enterprise can be sold as an ongoing con-
cern or should be liquidated."8
Assuming the enterprise can be sold as an operating entity, it
should be prepared for the sale.9 This requires: (1) converting the
state-owned enterprise's accounts and financial records into a form
that meets international accounting standards and allows the
preparation of reliable financial statements; (2) writing a report
identifying any potential problems with the sale; (3) engaging ad-
visors to help address legal issues related to the sale and to prepare
the necessary legal documents; and (4) appointing an eco-
nomic/financial advisor to valuate the company's assets and li-
abilities and perform other financial analyses.10
The enterprise may also have to be restructured to make it
more attractive to potential purchasers. First, if this has not been
done, the enterprise should be transformed into a corporation, to
/FILE17.PDF (discussing requests by Cuban-Americans that the office of Interna-
tional Claims & Investment Disputes take up their claims even though they were
not U.S. citizens at the time of confiscation); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Steven R.
Escobar, Cuba's Transition to a Free-Market Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes
to Laws and Legal Institutions, 5 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 379,412 (1995).
7 Charles Vuylsteke, Techniques of Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises, Vol.
1: Methods and Implementation, THE WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER 88 (1988).
8 UNITED NATIONS, ACCOUNTING, VALUATION AND PRIVATIZATION 14 (1993)
[hereinafter ACCOUNTING].
9 UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMIssION FOR EUROPE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
PRIVATIZATION IN INDUSTRY 35,36 (1992).
10 Id. at43.
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provide flexibility in the format of the subsequent sale, which may
proceed through the sale of the enterprise's assets or of its corpo-
rate stock.
Other necessary structural changes may include refinancing or
writing off debt, eliminating unprofitable lines of business, reduc-
ing the number of employees, hiring new managers, and disposing
of assets and liabilities that make the enterprise more difficult to
sell."
The discussion that follows examines the extent to which these
steps have been taken by Cuba's program and, if not, whether the
measures taken as part of the EOP are likely to facilitate taking
those steps at the onset of an SOE privatization program.
3. CUBA'S ENTERPRISE OPTIMIZATION PROGRAM
3.1. Background
The management of SOEs in state-dominated economies, such
as Cuba's,' 2 suffers from a number of shortcomings that prevent
the effective operation of the enterprises. 3 Basically, the govern-
ment uses SOEs to further its social and political goals. The state's
lack of concern for their efficient operation renders the SOEs un-
economical and, in most cases, incapable of functioning without fi-
nancial aid.' 4 As a result, SOEs become a burden on the state's fi-
nances and may cause imbalances in the country's economy.
In Cuba, the inefficiencies in the operation of SOEs were first
addressed by the country's armed forces ("FAR" or "Fuerzas Anna-
das Revolucionarias") through a program initiated in 1987 to im-
prove the operation of the numerous enterprises managed by the
11 ACCOUNTING, supra note 8, at 14-15.
12 Private ownership of income-producing property in Cuba is limited to
small plots of land in the hands of farmers, and the assets of joint ventures be-
tween state enterprises and foreign investors. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE
CUBA, reprinted in Gaceta Oficial art. 19-23 (Aug. 1,1992).
13 See, e.g., JOZEF M. VAN BRABANT, PRIVATIZING EASTERN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF
MARKETS AND OWNERSHIP IN THE TRANSITION 23, 26 (1992) (explaining that some of
the problems caused by centralized authority such as political patronage and a
constrictive bureaucracy have dire economic consequences, including
misallocation of capital, natural resources, and even land).
14 Horst Brezinski, The Autonomous Sector in a Society of Shortage, in
PRIVATIZATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN POST-SOCIALIsT COUNTRIES: ECONOMY,
LAW AND SOCIETY 33 (Bruno Dallago et al. eds., 1992).
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FAR.15 The FAR program progressed gradually from four firms in
September 1987 to essentially all FAR-operated enterprises ten
years later.' 6 However, the FAR enterprise upgrading remains in-
complete after fourteen years.'
7
Cuba's EOP, as instituted by Law 187, is an expansion to the
entire SOE apparatus' 8 of the FAR EOP, which the country's lead-
ership judged a success. The Fifth Congress of the Cuban Com-
munist Party adopted in October 1997 an Economic Resolution that
praised the FAR experiment as "particularly relevant" to improv-
ing the performance of the Cuban economy and called for the "ex-
tension to other areas of the economy of the principles followed by
the Armed Forces towards the perfecting of their enterprise sys-
tem, to be carried out to the fullest extent, in an orderly and pro-
grammed manner, taking into account the characteristics of each
activity." 9 Issuance of Law 187 followed after "a broad process of
consultation." 20
15 The FAR operate many enterprises in several segments of the economy,
including tourism. For example, Gaviota S.A., organized in 1990, owns resort
hotel properties that at the end of 1998 accounted for seven percent of Cuba's ho-
tel rooms and accommodated ten percent of the visitors to the island. See Grupo
de Turismo-Cuba, Gaviota, S.A., http://www.gaviota.cubaweb.cu/espanol
/index.html.
16 Jose A. Massip, et al., La Empresa Estatal Cubana y el Proceso de Perfec-
cionamiento Empresarial, CUBA SIGLO XXI (Feb. 2001) [hereinafter Empresa Estatal],
available at http://www.cubaxxi.f2s.com/economia/massip-.hdeznereyl-230101
.htm.
17 In the annual review meeting on the status of the EOP program for the
FAR, General Raul Castro, head of the FAR, stated that five enterprises still had
not approved optimization plans and noted the existence of widespread resistance
to linking employee salaries to enterprise performance, leading to the formulation
of unrealistic budgets and business plans. Remarks of General Raul Castro, El
Perfeccionamiento Empresarial Tiene que ser un Camino sin Retroceso, GRANMA (May
18, 2001), available at http://vww.granma.cubaweb.cu/2001/05/18/nacional
/articulol.html.
18 Enterprises wholly owned by the state currently provide employment to
over seventy percent of the Cuban workforce. Vascos, supra note 3.
19 Resolucion Economica del V Congreso del PCC (Oct 9, 1997), available at
http://www.nuevaempresa.cu/01_3.htm.
20 Law 187, supra note 1.
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3.2. Framework Created In Law 187
3.2.1. Fundamental Principles
The objectives of Law 187 are set forth in the "General Bases for
Enterprise Optimization" (Bases Generales del Perfeccionamiento Em-
presarial) ("General Bases"), which are part of the law.21 The "cen-
tral objective" of the EOP is "to increase to the maximum the effi-
ciency and competitiveness of SOEs by giving them such powers,
and establish such policies, principles and procedures, as will tend
to foster the initiative, creativity and accountability of all managers
and workers." 22 By linking the maximization of efficiency and
productivity with the grant of additional "powers" to the SOEs, the
General Bases establish the fundamental premise of the legislation,
i.e., that by decentralizing the management of the SOEs within es-
tablished "policies, principles and procedures," will make the en-
terprises more efficient. Implicit in that premise is the assumption
that decoupling the management of the enterprise from its owner-
ship will be beneficial to the SOE's economic health. For that rea-
son, under the EOP the state would retain ownership of the SOEs
but would allow the enterprise to manage its own affairs in a mar-
ket environment.23
Another fundamental principle of Law 187, proclaimed in the
General Bases, is that the SOEs should become economically self-
sufficient.24 Since labor costs are a crucial component of enterprise
21 Law 187 is a very short (less than half a page) document, consisting of an
introduction, two articles, one special provision, and two final provisions. Article
1 approves the General Bases which are "an annex" to the law, but which are not
included in the copy published in the Gaceta Oficial. Bases Generales del Perfec-
cionamiento Empresarial (Aug. 18, 1998) [hereinafter General Bases], available at
http://www.nuevaempresa.cu/Ol_5.htm. Article 2 of the law authorizes the es-
tablishment, by the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, of a tempo-
rary Government Group headed by the Secretary of the Executive Committee of
the Council of Ministers and comprised of five ministers and the head of the Cen-
tral Bank. The Government Group, assisted by an Executive Secretary, is charged
with the review of optimization proposals submitted by SOEs in accordance with
the General Bases. The proposals are not to be submitted by the SOEs directly,
but through the Organizaciones Superiores de Direccion Empresarial, described
below. Id.
22 General Bases, supra note 21.
23 See Empresa Estatal, supra note 16.
24 "Enterprise optimization is based on enterprise self-financing, which re-
quires that the enterprise pay its costs out of revenues and generate a profit"
General Bases, supra note 21.
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operating expenses, a related principle is that the labor costs
should be commensurate with the enterprises' economic perform-
ance. To accomplish this, salaries are not to be fixed, but pegged to
productivity.25 After-tax earnings may, if authorized, be retained
by the enterprise as capital reserves.
A corollary to the granting of administrative autonomy to the
SOEs is the principle that each enterprise could propose and im-
plement its own "tailor-made" approach for implementing its ver-
sion of the EOP-subject to approval by several layers of bureauc-
racy.26
Other fundamental principles are also set out in the General
Bases.2 7
3.2.2. Organizational Framework28
As provided by Law 187, the main instruments in the imple-
mentation of the EOP are the Government Group and its Executive
Secretary, both part of the Executive Committee of the Council of
Ministers. Below the Government Group are overseeing organiza-
tions known as "Higher Organizations of Enterprise Direction"
(Organizaciones Superiores de Direccion Empresarial) ("OSDEs"). The
OSDEs are set up by the Ministry of Finance for the purposes,
among others, of coordinating the EOP efforts of the various
enterprises in the same area of business, overseeing the
preparation of each enterprise's EOP, business plan and budget,
and submitting and defending those documents before the
enterprise's governing board and before the Ministry responsible
for the enterprise's economic activity.29 Within each OSDE, there is
a "governing board" consisting of five members chosen by the Ex-
ecutive Committee of the Council of Ministers.30 The board over-
25 Id. The General Bases declares bluntly: "Rewards will be given to results,
not efforts." Id.
26 Id.
27 For example, the management of each enterprise is to have the authority to
develop annual plans and budgets and to manage the enterprise's physical and
financial assets, as well as its labor force. Id.
23 The discussion in this Section is based on sections 1.2 and 2 of the General
Bases.
29 General Bases, supra note 21, § 2.1.
30 Id. § 3.1. The members of each board include one representative from the
Ministry of Economy, one from the Ministry of Finance, one from Cuba's Central
Bank, and another from the local government. The last member is an expert in the
SOE's specific industry. Id.
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sees each enterprise's business plan and budget and the execution
of the plan, and approves new lines of business.31 This structure is
similar to those of the board of directors of a corporation in a capi-
talist country, except that under the Cuban program, the board's
sole shareholder -whose interests are represented by the board -is
the state.
At the enterprise level, there are one or more parallel bodies to
the governing board of the OSDE. These bodies, whose establish-
ment is compulsory, have the generic name Collective Direction
Organs ("CDOs"), but in a given enterprise, they might be de-
nominated "governing council, management council, or board of
directors, among others."32 Their functions, modes of operation,
and composition are established by the enterprise's General Man-
ager. The CDOs provide advice on business strategy and on how
to develop and implement the enterprise's business plan. Thus,
the CDOs help manage the day-to-day affairs of the enterprise.
CDO recommendations become mandatory within the enterprise if
the General Manager approves them.
3.2.3. Stages in the EOP33
The EOP is to be implemented in seven stages. First, the
workforce and the labor unions must be trained to accept and sup-
port the process, and become active participants in it.34 This stage
focuses on explaining to the workforce the general principles of the
EOP and how they are accomplished, and securing through per-
suasion the workers' active cooperation.
The second stage is to conduct an initial diagnostic analysis of
the enterprise. This analysis is performed either by the SOE or "an
external group," depending on the condition of the enterprise. The
analysis evaluates the enterprise's history, its current status, its
future prospects, the state of its resources, its internal culture, and
its technical and managerial functions. The main purpose of the
31 Id. § 3.1.2.
32 Id. § 3.2.
33 These stages are described in section 1.2 of the General Bases, supra note 21.
34 The possibility that increased enterprise efficiency will result in employee
layoffs is addressed quite obliquely, as follows: "As workers become available, the
most appropriate measures will be taken (in coordination with the organizations
in the sector and the local labor oversight authorities) so that no worker is left un-
protected." General Bases, supra note 21, § 1.2.4.1.
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analysis is to identify internal and external problems and deter-
mine the manner in which the enterprise is being inefficient 35
The third step is an evaluation of the results of the diagnostic
analysis of the enterprise. This evaluation is conducted by the
Government Group of the Executive Committee of the Council of
Ministers. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether
the enterprise should be allowed to continue to implement the
program.36
The fourth step is to have each enterprise selected for partici-
pation in the EOP develop an optimization proposal (designated as
"expediente de perfeccionamiento empresarial" or "EPE"). The EPE is
in reality a detailed business plan that summarizes how the enter-
prise proposes to optimize its operations. The EPE is required to
address, among other subjects, the enterprise's business objectives,
its functions, its organizational structure, the proposed changes in
the manner in which the production of goods and services is ac-
complished, and the methods to implement internal controls,
planning, contracting, human resource management, marketing,
and information systems. 7 Each proposed change to the SOE is to
be evaluated in terms of cost and anticipated economic results.
The EPE is to set forth proposed economic performance objectives
and compare them to the enterprise's performance prior to imple-
mentation of the EOP. The EPE must also include an implementa-
tion schedule.
In the fifth stage,38 the EPE is submitted by the enterprise to the
OSDE that oversees the business sector. The OSDE, in turn, (pre-
sumably, after review and discussion with the enterprise) presents
the EPE to the Government Group of the Executive Committee of
the Council of Ministers, which determines whether the proposed
business plan satisfies the optimization principles set forth in the
General Bases and rules on whether the projected economic per-
formance is acceptable. If the EPE is approved, this approval is
communicated in writing to the enterprise, the OSDE, the corre-
35 Id. § 1.2.4.2
36 Id. § 1.2.4.3. The General Bases do not specify the consequences of a find-
ing that an enterprise does not qualify for the EOP. Presumably, however, since
the Cuban Government has placed great emphasis on the implementation of the
EOP, those enterprises that are deemed unqualified to participate in the program
may be candidates for eventual dissolution.
37 See id. § 1.2.4.4. (describing the functions and operations of an EPE).
3s See id. § 1.2.4.5. (explaining the OSDE's review and analysis of the EPE).
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sponding Ministry and other state instrumentalities, and the enter-
prise is released to implement the EPE.
The sixth stage is the implementation of the EPE by the enter-
prise.39 The seventh stage is described as a continuous process of
increased optimization, to be undertaken once the initial EPE ob-
jectives are accomplished.40
3.3. Functional Areas to be Addressed in the EOP
In implementing the EOP, each enterprise must address a
number of areas of enterprise activity or "subsystems," which are
defined in Section 1.3 of the General Bases to include:
" General Organization
o Management Methods and Styles
" Organization of the Production of Goods and Services
o Organization and Oversight of the Work Processes
o Quality Assurance
o Labor and Salary Policies
o Planning
o Contracting
o Accounting
o Cost Accounting
o Internal Controls
o Taxes and Internal Finances
o Outside Contracting
o Internal Communications
o Prices
" Human Relations
" Marketing
Each of these subsystems is addressed in a separate section of
the General Bases. The level of discussion is, in most instances,
non-specific: the General Bases only provide broad concepts with-
out the accompanying performance standards. For example, sec-
tion 8.3 describes the "Valuation and Data Presentation Principles"
applicable to enterprise accounting systems as follows:
39 General Bases, supra note 21, § 1.2.4.6. (describing the process of imple-
mentation for the EPE).
40 See id. § 1.2.4.7.
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" The financial statements issued by an enterprise must
be prepared using adequate and uniform techniques.
" To do this, and based on generally accepted principles
in effect in the country, it is necessary to establish
general accounting norms, giving priority to those
qualities that accounting information must possess.
" The accounting norms must be uniform, appropriate,
and explicit, with the objective of presenting informa-
tion that is adequate, correct, and timely. They must
also be easy to interpret and useful to all their users.41
The rest of the accounting section (section 8) of the General
Bases sets forth equally non-specific standards. Not all sections of
the General Bases, however, are devoid of specific content. Some
sections provide detailed insights into how the enterprise is ex-
pected to conduct its business. Of particular interest is the discus-
sion of internal finances, which establishes provisions for the uses
that can be made of enterprise profits. These uses include payment
of taxes, establishment of reserves against contingencies, making
capital contributions to the state, and establishing other types of
authorized reserves (e.g., reserves for research and development).
After these obligations have been funded, the remainder of the
enterprise profits (if certified as such by outside accountants) can
be treated as retained earnings and, if so decided by the manage-
ment of the enterprise, distributed to the employees as "material
incentives."42
Other sections that provide specific guidance to the enterprise
in carrying out the EOP are as follows.
3.3.1. Labor and Salany Policies43
Under the EOP, a Cuban SOE is free to develop its own
workforce management and make its own hiring and work as-
signment decisions, based on the applicants' qualifications. The
enterprise can also set work schedules, work hours, breaks and
other employment terms and conditions (including occupational
41 General Bases, supra note 21, § 8.3.
42 See id. § 11.2.2.2.
43 See id. § 10.
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health and safety provisions), disciplinary measures, training, and
other aspects of workforce management.
The law repeals previously existing requirements which speci-
fied that candidates for particular positions demonstrate having a
specified number of years of experience; prior experience becomes
one of the factors in judging applicant qualifications. Three types
of employment contract are recognized: employment for an in-
definite period; employment for a specific period or for a defined
task; and employment to render services at home. All employment
must be pursuant to a written contract, the general terms of which
are specified in the General Bases.
In terms of salaries, the General Bases establish four funda-
mental principles: (1) salaries must be pegged to economic results
obtained both by the employee and by the enterprise; (2) there
must be sufficient differentiation among salaries to account for the
degree of responsibility and technical demands of the different po-
sitions; (3) salary decisions must be decentralized to the extent pos-
sible; and (4) any salary readjustments must be preceded by a
showing that they can be financed from the economic resources
available to the enterprise. The General Bases also establish a
sliding scale of salaries based on four categories of employees:
production personnel, support personnel, administrative person-
nel, and technical personnel. The bottom salary, for unskilled la-
borers, is 130 pesos per month,44 while the top salary for an enter-
prise manager is set as 600 pesos per month. The members of the
governing boards of the OSDEs are allowed a salary of 700 pesos
per month.
As noted above, incentive payments may be provided to work-
ers (based on retained earnings) up to thirty percent of their base
salary; on the other hand, when the projected after tax profits are
not met, salary reductions of up to twenty percent of the base sal-
ary may be assessed.
3.3.2. Internal Controls4s
Each enterprise must set up an internal controls program to
protect the enterprise's resources from "waste, fraud and ineffi-
cient use." The internal controls are to include procedures for the
44 U.S. $6.50, at the prevailing rate of exchange of approximately U.S. $1 = 20
pesos.
45 General Bases, supra note 21, § 10.
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control of each enterprise activity, which must be "authorized, ap-
proved, carried out, and recorded." Another required control
mechanism is the functional separation between the accounting
and operation functions and between assets and their accounting
records. Also required are internal and external audits, with the
external audits being conducted only by independent accounting
firms approved by the state. Other internal control measures
identified in the General Bases include, among others: (1) keeping
cash in safes to which only the cashier has access; (2) performing
unscheduled audits of the cash at hand; (3) requiring petty cash
vouchers to be countersigned by the requiring petty cash cashier
and the cash recipient; (4) requiring daily deposit of sale proceeds;
(5) requiring that different people authorize and issue checks, on
the one hand, and reconcile bank statements; (6) keeping control of
warehouse inventories and transfers of warehoused materials; (7)
requiring that the person receiving goods at the warehouse be dif-
ferent from the one receiving the invoices for the goods; (8) re-
quiring periodic inventories of ten percent of the stored goods (9)
maintaining controls over the issuance of tools and materials; (10)
separating the functions of sale or delivery of goods from the in-
voicing and collection for such sales; and (11) keeping control over
the supply of blank invoices and requiring that such invoices be
pre-numbered.
3.4. Status of Enterprise Perfecting Program
Currently, there are 1,004 SOEs (thirty-one percent of all Cuban
firms) undergoing the EOP.46 In 1998, over 1,400 SOEs were se-
lected for transformation under the EOP; however, 400 had to
abandon the process due to serious deficiencies in internal ac-
counting.47 The majority of the firms chosen for upgrading are in
key industries that Cuba hopes to develop. Nearly all nickel explo-
ration companies, petroleum refineries, power companies, and
many agriculture companies are candidates for reform. Although
the government hopes to eventually reform all of Cuba's 3,000
46 Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Cuba: 1Fin del Descontrol?, ENCUENTRO EN LA RED,
May 21, 2001, available at http://vww.cubaencuentro.com/encuba/2001/05
/21/2381 /2.html.
47 Renato Recio, Perfeccionamiento empresarial: tortuga o liebre?, TRABAJADORES,
(Nov. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Tortuga], available at http://www.granma.cu
/espanol/no4/perfecci-e.html.
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SOEs, the firms in these fields are the most significant for Cuba's
economy.As
The number of SOEs that have reached the sixth stage of im-
plementing the optimization process has grown steadily, if not
rapidly. In 1999, only five firms received authorization from the
Government Group to proceed with their proposed reforms. In
2000, thirty-five firms had advanced to the implementation stage.49
As of May 2001, one hundred firms have been approved by the
Government Group to implement the process. 50 An additional two
hundred are expected to reach the EOP implementation phase by
the end of the year.
The government has taken other steps to hasten implementa-
tion of the reforms. On December 28, 2000, the University of
Camaguey released an interactive CD-ROM that will help busi-
nesses meet the goals of the EOP. The CD-ROM offers virtual con-
sulting, information on the EOP process, and advice from Cuban
business and managerial experts. 1 The CD-ROM comes in re-
sponse to the lack of business intelligence on the island. There is
insufficient training in Cuba in the use of business intelligence be-
cause the budgets of many SOEs do not allow for expenditures to-
wards the collection of information.52 Consulting groups, such as
Gestion Tecnologica in Santiago de Cuba, are being set up as the
demand for business advice becomes more evident.5 3 Consulting
firms help SOEs develop their EPEs, which then must be approved
by the Government Group.
In March 2001, Carlos Lage, Secretary of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Council of Ministers and Vice President of the Coun-
cil of State, announced the creation of the first twenty-six OSDEs,
an important step in the advancement of the EOP. As discussed
earlier, the OSDEs, which are comprised of ministers, vice-
48 Raisa Pages, El Cambio Mas Proffindo en la Economia Cubana, GRANMA Mar.
14, 2001 [hereinafter Cambio], available at http://www.granma.cu/espanol
/marzo2/11/perfecciona-e/html.
49 See Tortuga, supra note 47.
50 See Cambio, supra note 48.
51 Tel Pino Sosa, Presentan en Camaguey Multimedia sobre Perfeccionamiento em-
presarial, DIGITAL ADELANTE, Dec. 29, 2000, available at http://www.adelante.cu/
noticias/ciencias/20/12/cdperfecc29.htm.
52 Lillian Riera, Inteligencia Empresarial: Imprescindible para Lograr Competividad
(Nov. 29,2000), at http://www.granma.cu/espanol/no5/49inteli-e.html.
53 See Gestion Tecnologica, available at http://www.santiago.cu/ciencia/
megacen/gestionjtecnologica.htm.
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ministers, and other high functionaries of the Cuban government,
serve as direct intermediaries between the SOEs and the Council of
Ministers. They are also responsible for monitoring and assessing
the progress of the various firms as they implement the EOP. 4
Despite claims that the EOP is moving too slowly, government
officials claim to be satisfied with its progress. Armando Perez
Bentacourt, executive secretary of the Government Group, claims
that the process may seem to be moving slowly because the Cuban
population is so anxious to see results. However, positive results
cannot be expected to instantly materialize.55 Still, several signs
indicate that the EOP is working:
" Government subsidies to failing SOEs have decreased.
These subsidies placed a great strain on the Cuban
budget. In 1994, for example, the government paid
5.75 billion pesos in subsidies to SOEs. In 2001, the
government plans to reduce this amount to 300 million
pesos.5
6
" Enterprises that have already implemented the EPEs
are growing more quickly than the overall economy.
Last year, SOEs that implemented structural reforms
reported a 9.5% increase in sales over 1999 levels.W
* The petroleum industry, which was almost non-
existent before the collapse of the USSR, has also made
substantial economic improvements. In 2000, Cuban
refineries produced a record high three million tons of
petroleum, a fifty percent increase over the 1999 out-
put.W
54 Importante Paso en el Perfeccionamiento Empresarial, RADIO RELOJ, Mar. 27,
2001, available at http://www.radioreloj.cu/economia/eco27-3-01.htm.
55 Tortuga, supra note 47.
56 Roberto Morejon, Las Empresas Cubanas Operan con Menos Subsidios Estatales
por Perdidas, available at http://www.radiohc.org/Distributions/RadioHavana
Espanol/.2000.
57 See Tortuga, supra note 47.
53 Marta Veloz, Petroleo: Estrategias, Resultados y Perspectivas, OPCIONES Feb.
11, 2001, available at http://www.opciones.cubaweb.cu/.
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Despite these signs of success, many people remain skeptical of
the EOP, and in some SOEs the optimization process has been de-
layed by workers' concerns over salaries and monetary incentives.
Currently, a sixth of Cuba's work force receives monetary rewards
for increased production, which are awarded if the enterprise ex-
ceeds some production goal.5 9 As noted earlier, the EOP links in-
dividual salaries to individual output, not the output of the entire
enterprise. This system is criticized as inequitable.60
Workers also worry that they may be fired from their jobs, an
inevitable step due to the restructuring of inefficient SOEs. The
first sixty-four SOEs to implement reforms laid off 2.5% of their
workers.6' Cuban law guarantees these workers sixty percent of
their income while they look for new jobs. However, it is feared
that implementation of the EOP will ultimately lead to massive un-
employment.62
Another obstacle to the success of the EOP is the lack of ac-
countability in Cuban enterprises. Except for the few enterprises
that have entered the final stage of the EOP, Cuban businesses op-
erate under "soft-budget constraints." Since bankruptcy is not a
threat, SOEs are not confined to their budgets as capitalist busi-
nesses are.63 The lack of business accountability and the poor ac-
counting practices have made it extremely easy to embezzle money
or commodities from one's place of employment.64 In March of
2001, the Ministry of Prices and Finance declared that only 675 of
over 3,000 SOEs employed adequate accounting measures.65
In many cases, there are no incentives for managers and work-
ers to reform the SOEs, since they can make more money by under-
59 See Jonathan Silberman & Mary-Alice Waters, Cuban Workers Discuss Re-
forms in Factory Management, THE MILITANT, June 5, 2000, at I (discussing how Cu-
ban workers are trying to influence Cuban industrial and economic policies),
available at http://www.themilitant.com/2000/6422/642202.html.
60 See id. at 6.
61 Cambio, supra note 48.
62 Reinaldo Cosano Alen, Perfeccionamiento Aumenta Ejercito de Desocupados
CUBANET, Dec. 23, 1999, available at http://64.21.33.164/CNews/y99/dec99
/23a9.htm.
6 Interview by Buro de Informacion de Derechos Humanos with Oscar Espinosa
Chepe (Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Chepe Interview] (discussing the critical situa-
tion in the Cuban economy).
64 Charles Trumbull, Economic Reforms and Social Contradictions in Cuba, 10
CUBA IN TRANSITION 305 (2000), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la
/cb/cuba/asce/cubal0/ascel0.pdf.
65 See Cambio, supra note 48.
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reporting earnings or stealing unaccounted-for products than they
could earn from productivity bonuses. An independent Cuban
economist states: "The lack of control in the management of public
goods and the corruption constitute the gravest problems that soci-
ety has faced over the past years. These phenomena not only pro-
duce immeasurable losses, but degrade society as a whole."
66
As a result, the EOP faces as its most serious challenge chang-
ing the way that enterprises and their managers do business.
4. ENTERPRISE REFORM CASE STUDIES
4.1. Introduction
A privatization program may be designed to be implemented
slowly, or to take place as rapidly as the circumstances permit.
Gradual privatization is used in countries that seek to retain a cen-
trally-planned economic system. China and Vietnam, for example,
are implementing gradual privatization programs designed to be
carried out over long periods of time.67 These programs have
proved to be cumbersome and their effectiveness has been im-
peded by political constraints. Nonetheless, even these limited ef-
forts have been beneficial in driving the management and workers
of SOEs toward profit-seeking activities, resulting in increased
productivity.68
A rapid privatization program is one whose goal is to turn
SOEs over to the private sector as quickly as practicable. Rapid
privatization methods attract private investors and foster the re-
emergence of a domestic enterprise sector. They are, therefore, the
most appropriate methods for handling the transition from a state-
controlled economy to a free-market economy. As discussed be-
66 See Chepe Interview, supra note 63.
67 FREEHILL HOLUNGDALE & PAGE, VIETNAM: A BUSINESS GUIDE 103 (1991);
Fang Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149
(1995); Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in
Cfina, 1993 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 301 (1993); Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two
Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in
China, 12 UCLA PAc. BASIN LJ. 62 (1993).
63 China has coupled the limited opening of SOEs to private ownership
through the sale of enterprise stock to the public with a grant of increased opera-
tional autonomy to its SOEs. BARBARA LEE & JOHN NELUS, ENTERPRISE REFORM AND
PRIVATIZATION IN SOcIAuST ECONOMIES 7, 9 (1990). As discussed earlier, the sec-
ond half of that equation is analogous to a stated objective of the EOP in Cuba.
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low, rapid privatization was the method used in East Germany af-
ter Germany was reunified in 1989.
This Section examines both privatization styles by summariz-
ing the enterprise reforms instituted in China (as the prime expo-
nent of gradual privatization) and East Germany (as an example of
rapid privatization). The Article makes no assumption regarding
the method of SOE privatization that Cuba may seek to implement;
rather, the focus will be on what activities prior to (or in the early
stages of) privatization tend to facilitate the successful completion
of the process.
4.2. The Chinese Experience
4.2.1. Initial SOE Reforms in China
China is a self-proclaimed socialist country that continues to
retain its allegiance to a command economy. Yet, it has gradually
become marketized through a process that involved, among other
things, a reform of the state enterprise system. 69 The main objec-
tive of SOE reform involved providing incentives for enterprises
and individuals to be more effective through profit retention, a
dual-price system, and the contract responsibility system described
below.70 All these measures were designed to reduce price distor-
tion, increase SOE competitiveness, and reap the profit generated
by free markets.7'
To bring SOEs within the market's orbit without relinquishing
state ownership, China created a framework aimed at separating
the government's ownership of an enterprise from its management
and administration.72 Reforms began in the rural areas, where
people's communes were disbanded and replaced by a "household
69 Lan Cao, Public Perspectives on Privatization: Chinese Privatization: Between
Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (2000) [hereinafter Perspectives].
Since the beginning of market reforms, however, Chinese officials have drawn a
distinction between marketization (which they favor) and SOE privatization
(which they oppose). As will be further discussed below, parallel with the insti-
tution of SOE reforms, the Chinese government has also allowed the development
of a non-state sector side by side with the state sector. See Lan Cao, The Cat That
Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 97,100 (1995) [hereinafter The Cat That].
70 See Perspectives, supra note 69.
71 See id.
72 See NATALIE LICHTENSTEIN, ENTERPRISE REFORM IN CHINA: THE EVOLVING
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 5 (World Bank PoI'y Res. Working Paper No. 1198,1993).
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responsibility system."73 The land remained communally owned,
but households were allowed to contract to cultivate the plots and
were given incentives to increase productivity. The communes' as-
sets needed for production were sold to the households at low
prices, and a type of contractual arrangement was instituted under
which farmers organized by "household unit," contracted with the
state to sell a set quantity of products at a government-set price,
but any surplus above the established quota could be sold in the
open market at open-market prices. This initial, limited reshaping
of the SOE system led to improvements in the performance in the
agricultural sector, especially in the production of grain.74
The Chinese government expanded in 1984 the agricultural
sector reforms to other SOEs.75 The concept of "responsibility
contracts" was made applicable to all SOEs and all levels of the
production and distribution chain. Under the reformed system,
SOEs enter into contracts with the state that set production targets
for the enterprise to meet within a specified period of time.76 After
the targeted performance goals are met, the enterprise is allowed to
retain any excess profit for use as its management deems neces-
sary, thus giving management limited rights over production,
marketing, labor, procurement, investment, and asset disposition. 7
Subsequently, in 1992, regulations were issued that expressly
conferred upon a SOE a number of powers, including the power to:
73 Xinqiang Sun, Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises: A Legal Perspective,
31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19 (1999).
74 Perspectives, supra note 69 at 29-30. Cuba copied the Chinese model when it
instituted the Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa ("UBPCs") in 1993 and
subsequently established the "mercados agropecuarios," that is, agricultural markets
in which agricultural products are sold by farmers to the public at free-market
prices. See, e.g., Hans-Jfxrgen Burchadt, La Descentralizaci6n de las Granjas Estatales
en Cuba: iiGrmen para una Reforma Empresarial Pendiente?, 10 CUBA IN TRANSITION
64 (2000), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cubalO
/bruchardtpdf.
75 Sun, supra note 73, at 20-21.
76 See Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and
the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 62, 73
(1993).
77 See Rules on Transforming Management of State Enterprises, ch. IL arts. 6-
22 (1992), Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (1992),
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (July 29,1992), available in LEXIS,
World Library, BBCSWB File, cited by Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan
and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 13 (2001).
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(1) make decisions with respect to production and opera-
tion; (2) fix prices for their products and services; (3) pur-
chase materials; (4) import and export; (5) make investment
decisions; (6) dispose of reserved funds; (7) dispose of as-
sets; (8) form a joint venture, or merge, with another enter-
prise; (9) hire employees; (10) sell its products; (11) manage
its personnel; (12) decide wages, salaries and bonuses; (13)
set up internal offices; and (14) resist or reject resources of-
fered by the state, including human, material resources and
financial apportionment. 78
Under the regulations, SOEs are expected "to become, under
the law, units for commodity production and management with
autonomy, sole responsibility for their own profits and losses, self-
development and self-command, and to become legal persons
competent to enjoy civil rights and to assume civil responsibilities
independently."79
The potential evolution of the SOEs into more independent en-
tities, however, was hampered because the Chinese government
authorized the establishment of enterprises that included limited
or no state participation.80 These enterprises included joint ven-
tures between the state and a foreign investor, collectives known as
township and village enterprises ("TVEs") and even wholly owned
foreign enterprises.81 Completion from these private enterprises
had a detrimental effect on SOEs, which never had faced true com-
petition in the market.8 2 High costs and low efficiency continued
to plague the SOEs, which remained unable to compete with the
private sector.
4.2.2. The "Modem Enterprise System"
Another solution was needed, and China instituted the "mod-
em enterprise system" program in 1995 with the goal of "corpora-
78 Regulations on Converting the Operational Forces in the Industrial Enter-
prises Under the Ownership of the Whole People (1992), quoted in Sun, supra note
73, at 23-24.
79 See Rules on Transforming Managements of State Enterprises, supra note
77, art. 2.
80 See The Cat That, supra note 69, at 102.
81 Id. at 103.
82 See Sun, supra note 73, at 21.
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tization" of the SOEs.83 Selected SOEs were reorganized into cor-
porate entities having ownership rights, property rights, and
dearly defined managerial responsibilities. 84 The government es-
tablished two stock exchanges to promote the development and
expansion of the enterprise transformation program.85 Only a
small portion of the SOEs have participated in this program, and
most of the enterprises participating are small or medium size
SOEs.86 This is "due to the government's reluctance to introduce
[private] ownership into large and super-large state-owned enter-
prises." 87 Many small enterprises were left to fend for themselves,
and either succeeded, sold out, or merged.88
The major features of the Chinese enterprise reform program
included:
* Transforming the SOEs into corporations by a re-definition
of their ownership.
* Allowing individuals to buy shares in the SOEs in the stock
markets and become minority owners of the enterprises.
" Requiring the corporatized SOEs to set up boards of direc-
tors that represent all owners' interests.
* Establishing separate entities (supervisory boards) that su-
pervise the management of each enterprise.
" Requiring that the supervisory boards include outside spe-
cialists in business management.89
83 JUN MA, THE WORLD BANK, CHINAS ECONoMIc REFORM IN THE 1990S ch. 5
(1997), at http://members.aol.com/junmanew /chap5.htm.
84 See Sun, supra note 73, at 28.
8s5 See id.
86 Of the 380,000 SOEs in China, only 1.5% have become joint stock compa-
nies. They represent, however, six percent of the production and account for
thirteen percent of the profits of the Chinese SOE system. Id. at 21, 28-29.
87 MA, supra note 83, at ch. 5.
88 See Sun, supra note 73, at 35.
89 See id. (describing the major aspects of the Chinese enterprise reform pro-
gram).
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The expectation which underlays the initiation of the modem
enterprise system was that it would help separate the govern-
ment's regulatory duties from the commercial functions of the
SOEs.90 Experts have concluded, however, that the "modem en-
terprise system" has had only limited impact on improving the
SOEs' efficiency, and that there are still serious organizational
problems in the SOEs from the standpoint of corporate govern-
ance.91
Corporatized SOEs still have inconsistencies in the relation-
ships between the "shareholders' congress" (the shareholders'
meeting) and the government, the board of directors and the en-
terprise managers, and the government organizations and the gov-
ernance of the enterprise.92 First, the shareholders congress is re-
quired to obtain authorization from the government before its
decisions become effective, thus the shareholders-particularly the
private ones -have no independent powers but continue to be
subordinated to the government. 93 Second, enterprise managers
are not appointed by the board of directors but by the government
authorities, and the post of general manager is held by the chair-
man of the board.94 Third, the chairman of the board (and enter-
prise general manager) is appointed by the government instead of
being selected by the board or the shareholders. 9 In short, the
creation of the "modern enterprise system" has failed to achieve
the separation of functions between enterprise ownership and
management, both of which remain with the state.
There are also structural problems with the modern enterprise
system in that there are functional overlaps between the general
managers and the director of the board, and in the administrative
appointment of SOE managers.96 Furthermore, three pre-reform
committees, party committee, trade union, and the congress of
workers representatives, co-exist with the three new ones, the
90 See id. (explaining the expectations underlying a modem enterprise sys-
tem).
91 See id. (describing the limitations of a modem enterprise system).
92 Jin Heting, On Corporatization of Enterprises and Corporate Governance, in
POLICY OPTIONS FOR REFORM OF CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (Harry G.
Broadman ed., 1998).
93 See id.
94 See id.
9 See id.
96 MA, supra note 83.
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shareholders congress, the board of directors, and the supervisory
board. There seems to be a lack of clear definition of the responsi-
bilities of these entities and the relationships among them causes
internal conflicts and inefficiency in decision-making.
97
The implementation of the modem enterprise system has also
not resulted in a change of the internal structure of the SOEs.98 Ac-
cording to the results of a study that examined the composition of
the board of directors and the supervisory committee in the corpo-
ratized SOEs, members of the board and the supervisory commit-
tee are dominated by the government officials, and the state share-
holders are over-represented in proportion to individual
shareholders in both the board and the supervisory committee.99
This is true even though the law prohibits government officials
from remaining entrenched in company management.10°
Despite these deficiencies, the results of China's enterprise re-
form initiatives have been generally positive. Reported data re-
veals that the gross output value of state enterprises increased
from 342.1 billion yuan in 1978 to 1.35 trillion yuan in 1988.101 The
total factor of productivity in state-owned industries also increased
during the 1980s at an annual average of 2.4%. After enterprise re-
form, joint-stock companies have demonstrated greater vitality and
performed better in the market than traditional SOEs, even though
they make up only 1.5 % of all SOEs in China. 0 2
4.2.3. Flaws in the Chinese SOE Reform Model
As just described, those SOEs that the Chinese government has
allowed to institute the "modem enterprise system" in order to be-
come more competitive have exhibited operational improvements.
However, the progress of SOEs towards optimization has been im-
97 See id.
93 XIAONIAN XU & YAN WANG, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF CHINESE STOCK
COMPANIES 25-26 (The World Bank Institute, Policy Research Working Paper No.
1794, 1997), at http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers
/WPS1700series/wps1794/wps1794.pdf.
99 See id.
100 See Sun, supra note 73, at 32.
101 Thomas G. Rawski, Progress Without Privatization: The Reform of China's
State Industries, in CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-
COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES (1994) (quoting Anming Gao, Gi-
ant Tractor Maker Plagued by Slaw Sales, CHINA DAILY, May 28,1991, at 4).
102 See Sun, supra note 73, at 28.
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peded by a number of constraints and problems, which are
strongly reminiscent of those reported in Cuba under the EOP:
" Lack of separation between enterprise ownership and man-
agement.103 This is ironic (because, like in Cuba, the fun-
damental tenet of SOE reform in China is to allow enter-
prises a greater degree of enterprise self-government) and
at the same time predictable. As in Cuba, multiple layers of
Chinese bureaucracy exist at the national, provincial, and
local level, all with entrenched powers over the SOE, which
they are unwilling to give up.04 The SOE management is
powerless to raise objections to the government's meddling
in the internal affairs of the enterprise, since the state is
both owner and regulator, and SOE managers who oppose
government directives risk transfer or removal. 05 The most
effective way to accomplish this separation, and the one
that is now being instituted to a limited extent in China (but
not in Cuba) is the privatization of at least the small- and
medium-sized SOEs.06
Corruption, particularly among managers. As their power
increases, managers have more opportunities (which they
often seize) to appropriate an increasing share of the corpo-
rate resources. 07
103 Id. at 38-39.
104 Id. at 40-43. The problem has been characterized as follows: "Various ad-
ministrative agencies at both the national and local levels invested in an enterprise
vie to exercise control over it, thereby subjecting the enterprise to overlapping and
often conflicting vertical -usually one of the industrial administrative bodies at-
tached to a central ministry-as well as horizontal -usually the local people's
governments or their agencies-lines of authority." Perspectives, supra note 69, at
37.
105 Sun, supra note 73, at 39-40.
106 Privatization is not always feasible, however, because many Chinese SOEs
cannot be sold, either because of their poor financial condition or because there
are few Chinese nationals who can afford to buy them. With respect to SOEs en-
gaged in important industries, such as transportation, telecommunications, and
national defense, it would be politically unacceptable to sell to foreign nationals.
Id. at 43.
107 Id. at 44-45. Potential ways to address the corruption problem include
external auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, the establishment of
suitable incentive compensation systems, and reforming the state employment
system so that managers have a real risk of unemployment if the enterprise is not
successful. Id. at 45-46.
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* Enterprise asset stripping by managers acting in collusion
with workers.03
* Misuse of public resources through the purchase of com-
modities at lower, official prices and subsequent resale at a
higher price on the non-state market.109
* Informational uncertainties, unreliable accounting, and in-
consistent financial data." 0
* Arbitrary and excessive taxation."'
* Overproduction and reckless investment in plant capac-
ity.
12
* Asset inflation due to measures by managers to show prof-
its, whether true or not. Such measures include unwilling-
ness to recognize bad debts, inflation of receivables and
credits, and underestimation of depreciation and costs. 3
* Siphoning of public resources towards weaker SOEs
through improvident loans by state banks and state infu-
sions of cash to stem potential layoffs by failing enter-
prises."4
These difficulties have led an analyst to the following pessi-
mistic assessment of the SOE reform process in China:
Within the [SOE] itself, governmental decentralization, the
downward transfer of rights, and the separation of the firm
from the state have resulted in more autonomy for manag-
ers as intended, but they also set in to motion a web of
103 Perspectives, supra note 69, at 42.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 37.
111 Id. at 38.
112 Id. at 41.
113 Perspectives, supra note 69, at 41.
114 Id. at 42.
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causally linked and distorted incentives that are difficult to
rectify because of the absence of internal and external con-
trols.115
The Chinese government has continued to experiment with
methods to privatize medium and large-size SOEs." 6 An ongoing
experiment has designated enterprises throughout China to ex-
periment with optimizing the capital structure and establishing
modern business operating systems." 7 It remains to be seen
whether the experiment will constitute another step towards the
eventual privatization of these and other SOEs.
4.3. The East German Model
Some economists have called the East German ("GDR") econ-
omy a transfer economy rather than a transitional economy." 8 East
Germany adopted the German Deutschmark, instituted German
laws and legal norms, and sold the majority of its firms to German
investors." 9 Unlike China or the U.S.S.R., which slowly restruc-
tured and privatized SOEs, East Germany turned all former SOEs
into companies under German corporate law. These companies
remained under the control of a trust agency, the Treuhandanstalt
("Treuhand"), until they were sold as private companies or liqui-
dated.
The transformation to a private property system was initiated
by the GDR's enactment of the Treuhandgesetz ("Trust Law"). 120
The law created the Treuhand, which instantly became the largest
holding company in the world with control over 12,370 busi-
115 Id. at 42-43.
116 Privatization of small SOEs is no longer a problem. Government regula-
tions issued jointly in 1998 by the State Commission of Economy and Trade, the
Treasury Department, and the People's Bank (China's central bank) establish
guidelines for the sale and purchase of small SOEs. Such sales are well under way
in China, although the process is not officially acknowledged as privatization.
Sun, supra note 73, at 35.
117 Id. at 36.
118 Bernhard Seliger, Two Sides to This Coin, 3 CENT. EUR. REv. 3, Jan. 22, 2001,
[hereinafter Coin], available at http://www.ce-review.org/01/3/seliger3.html.
119 Bernhard Seliger, Ten Years After German Unification, 3 CENT. EUR. REv. 2,
Jan. 15, 2001, [hereinafter Unification], available at http://www.ce-review.org
/01/2/seliger2.html.
120 Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermo-
gens (Treuhandgesetz), v. 22.6.1990 (GBI. I S.300) (G.D.R.) [hereinafter Trust Law].
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nesses.' 2 ' The first words of the Trust Law declared emphatically
that privatization was to occur "as quickly and as comprehensively
as possible."122
The Treuhand, in turn, became the owner of all of the shares of
these companies and was responsible for preparing them for sale
to the private sector.123 The Treuhand was required by law to
evaluate the economic positions of these companies; it determined
which enterprises were competitive enough to be privatized,
which should be dismantled, and which should be liquidated.124 In
all companies with over 500 employees the Treuhand established
advisory boards. These boards, consisting mainly of representa-
tives from West Germany's government, businesses, and banks,
were responsible for drawing up plans to restructure the corpora-
tion, contract short term managers, and make other necessary
changes. 25
The sale of the companies was the most important part of the
privatization process. Before the Treuhand could sell interests in
the formerly state-owned enterprises, it first needed reliable valua-
tions of them. 26 The Financial Statement Law required enterprises
considered for privatization to prepare financial statements using
Deutschmark valuationsj 27 If the prospects for survival were
questionable, the Treuhand decided against privatization and liq-
uidated the company.128 If, however, the company's prospects for
survival were promising, the Treuhand would fund the company
121 The Treuhand was created by the GDR prior to reunification and was in-
tegrated into the government of the Federal Republic in the Treaty on Unification,
where it became a federal agency overseen by the Minister of Finance. See Vertrag
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutchen Demokratischen
Republik uber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (Einigungsvertrag), art.
25, v. 28.9.1990 (BGB1. II S.897), translated in 30 I.L.M. at 481 [hereinafter Unifica-
tion Treaty].
122 TRUST LAW, supra note 120.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 Is Germany's Treuhand a Good Thing?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21,1992, at 71.
126 See Unification, supra note 119.
127 See Besondere Bestimmungen fumur Fortgeltendes Recht der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik, ch. HI, 1(2), v. 28.9.1990 (BGBl. II S.1173) [hereinafter
Financial Statement Law].
128 Id.
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up to the amount of its debt.129 The company would then be pre-
pared for direct sale into the private sector.
The strategy of rapid privatization was grounded on the as-
sumption that the costs of rehabilitation faced by private investors
would be considerably lower than those of the Treuhand.130 Aside
from the transfer of economic and technical knowledge and the
mobilization of private capital, what the Treuhand ultimately ex-
pected from a rapid privatization was the chance for East German
enterprises to overcome barriers to market entry.'3' The survival of
East German firms could be ensured only by making them com-
petitive, which could be accomplished only by investing substan-
tial sums into their rehabilitation. 32 The Treuhand for the most
part decided against financing rehabilitation itself, opting instead
for a "privatization of rehabilitation."133
Many East German companies, however, were unattractive to
private investors. Although the Deutschmark was valued 1:4 to
the Ostmark, the two currencies were officially united at a 1:1 ra-
tio. Subsequently, East Germany's labor force became grossly
overpaid, and capital stock devalued by fifty percent. 34 These
factors, combined with the poor state of East German companies
and resources, discouraged many investors.
The Treuhand was faced with two options: retain and re-
structure these companies until they could be sold at market
prices, or sell them to private investors at subsidized prices. The
Treuhand opted for the latter. Thus, the Treuhand invited inves-
tors by assuming outstanding company debt, subsidizing costs of
development, and assuming environmental liabilities. In many
cases, the Treuhand sold companies for a loss, after taking into ac-
count payments on accrued debt. 35 In return, investors agreed to
invest set amounts of money, maintain a certain number of jobs,
continue and increase production levels, and consent to labor wage
contracts that would slowly increase wages.36
129 See Norbert Horn, The Lawful German Revolution: Privatization and Market
Economy in a Re-Unified Germany, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 725,739 (1991).
130 See, e.g., HERBERT BRUCKER, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN GERMANY (1997).
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See Coin, supra note 118.
135 Privatisation: Farewell, Sweet Treuhand, EcoNoMisT, Dec. 24, 1994, at 82.
136 See id. at 83.
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Other than initial evaluations and limited restructuring in
larger companies, the Treuhand did little to prepare former SOEs
for privatization. Many critics claim that the Treuhand should
have restructured these companies and sold them at competitive
prices and at a time when the economy was stronger. 37 Instead,
after four years the Treuhand incurred a 270 billion Deutschmark
debt which must be financed by the German state. The desire to
quickly dump these companies on the world market led the
Treuhand to sell them at only ten percent of what they had for-
merly expected to raise.1
38
The Treuhand did, however, maintain control of key industries
for East Germany until they could find appropriate buyers. The
Treuhand, for example, maintained and invested in EKO Stahl, a
large steel mill by the Polish border, for four years before eventu-
ally selling it. Even though the Treuhand could have liquidated
these companies and avoided losses, the subsequent loss of jobs
would have created social unrest.
39
The effect of East Germany's rapid privatization has had mixed
effects on the economy. Unemployment initially skyrocketed as
managers downsized the overpaid workforce that was draining
capital reserves. About half of the workers in the former GDR lost
their job, and 600,000 migrated to western Germany. 40 Neverthe-
less, East Germany's economy grew about nine percent in 1994.
GDP, per capita income, and productivity have all increased rela-
tive to West Germany. Still, unemployment remains a problem in
East Germany. This is due to the Treuhand's efforts to provide
"equal pay for equal work" in the former GDR and West Germany.
Companies agreed to boost wages eleven-fold by 1996, rendering
many companies inefficient and struggling to compete.' 4'
Although Germany's method of privatization has had mostly
desirable effects, it may not be a suitable model for other countries
to follow. The GDR had the advantage of unification with an eco-
nomic superpower that could finance the debt incurred by the pri-
vatization of inefficient companies. Furthermore, unification with
Germany provided the economic and political stability needed to
137 East German Privatisation: Fast and Loose, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30,1994, at 75.
13 See id. at 83.
139 See id.
140 Bernhard Seliger, Almost There, 3 CENT. EUR. REv., Feb. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.ce-review.org/01/5/seliger.html.
141 See id. at 2.
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attract foreign investment. Finally, the well-educated East German
work force, and a strong service sector offered insurance that the
privatization process would eventually be profitable, even if it
would suffer in the short run.142 Thus, East Germany's transition
cannot be evaluated or applied to other scenarios without carefully
considering the surrounding factors.
5. IS CUBA'S PERFECCIONAMIENTO EMPRESARIAL LAW
A STEP TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION?
5.1. Actions Contemplated in the EOP that Would Aid in the
Preparation of Cuban SOEs for Eventual Sale
As noted in Section 2, a first step in privatization is a thorough
examination of the SOE's finances and operations. Cuba's EOP
program ostensibly accomplishes this step through the perform-
ance of the initial diagnostic analysis of the enterprise. To the ex-
tent that the evaluation is thoroughly performed, it will be a valu-
able first step towards a possible privatization.143 If the assessment
is based on proper accounting methods and provides an adequate
disclosure of the company's finances, the program will give poten-
tial investors a good sense of how much an enterprise is worth. In
addition, if the valuation is performed competently, it will serve
(as was the case in East Germany) as a triage tool to allow the state
to determine which enterprises can be sold and which need to be
liquidated.144
The second necessary step towards the privatization of SOEs
involves taking a number of measures to prepare it for the sale. Of
these, only the first (bringing the enterprise's accounting records
and methods to modem standards) can be accomplished before the
decision to sell is implemented. Cuba's EOP gives at least lip
142 LUCJAN T. ORLOWSKI, PRESENT STAGES OF EcoNoMic REFORMS AND
PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, (The Helen Kellogg Institute for Int'l
Stud., Working Paper No. 156, 1991), available at http://www.nd.edu
/ %7Ekellogg/WPS/156.pdf.
143 Depending on how far into the future the actual privatization takes place,
this evaluation may need to be updated or repeated, but the initial exercise should
provide a good starting point in any instance.
144 Although Cuba has yet to take steps to liquidate unprofitable enterprises,
the initial selection of SOEs to be included in the EOP, and the subsequent culling
of some enterprises based on the results of the valuation, suggest that Cuba has
already indirectly made the cut as to what SOEs will be supported towards possi-
ble solvency and which will be eliminated by some method or another.
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service to accounting reform, which is one of the subsystems in-
tended to be covered by the program. Because transparent, com-
petent accounting is inconsistent with enterprise raiding by man-
agement and employees, actual implementation of accounting
reforms may be as difficult in Cuba as it has been in China.
The third step is to transform the SOE into a corporation, so
that there is flexibility in the format of the subsequent sale. East
Germany took this step at the outset, and China did so to a limited
extent in the second phase of its SOE reform program. Cuba has
not yet done so.
The fourth step includes taking a series of enterprise "get well"
measures including refinancing or writing off debt, eliminating
unprofitable lines of business, reducing the number of employees,
hiring new managers, and disposing of assets and liabilities that
make the enterprise more difficult to sell. In order for the EOP to
result in profitable SOEs in Cuba, some of these measures will in-
evitably have to be undertaken, and should be part of the business
plan in the enterprise's EPE. Thus, at least in theory, the EOP
should accomplish this step wholly or in part. In addition, to the
extent that enterprises are made more efficient, this would lead to a
higher valuation and a better sale price.
5.2. Comparative Outlook Based on Reference Countries' Experience
Cuba's EOP is closest in structure and objectives to the Chinese
enterprise reform program. In China, early reforms focused on
making Chinese enterprises more competitive, efficient, and pro-
ductive, as does Cuba's current program. Specific productivity
goals were set for each company, and incentives were given to
meet or exceed them. Cuba has already instituted such a program
in the agricultural sector, and is moving towards doing so in the
EOP. Cuba, however, has yet to allow the development of a non-
state sector to complement the SOE transformation.
With the adoption of the modem enterprise system, China
went a step further as it sought to achieve structural reforms
within its SOEs. The specific strategies of the program are very
similar to those in Cuba's EOP. Both countries have sought to es-
tablish independent management structures through the estab-
lishment of boards of directors, and have tried to make their SOEs
closer in operational freedom to Western business organizations.
However, while Chinese corporate law nominally seeks to extricate
the state from the day-to-day business of the SOEs, the actual com-
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position of boards and key offices is still directed and peopled by
government actors. Cuba's EOP does not even make such an at-
tempt, since the program specifically requires that the majority of
the members of outside governing boards be state officials. It also
subjects enterprise management to the authority of both the OSDEs
and the Cabinet-level Government Group. In this sense, Cuba has
made even less progress in removing the state's control over the
enterprise than the Chinese approach. Perhaps China's more liber-
alized system reflects its acknowledgment of past failures with
enterprise reform, an experience likely to be repeated in Cuba.
East Germany's pace of privatization was very swift, as com-
pared to China's. Its focus on SOE efficiency was not an effort to
improve enterprise operations, but a test administered to deter-
mine whether a company should be selected for privatization or
liquidation. Reforming and improving efficiency of SOEs was left
to the purchaser. Overall, this approach stands in stark contrast to
that prescribed by the Cuban program even though both involve
evaluating and hand-picking the enterprises that will participate in
the program.
The East German model of rapid action is unlikely to be im-
posed on Cuba absent a major near term transformation in the state
apparatus. Nor is there a familiarity with a market-based economy
and the presence of institutions that embody market principles in
Cuba, as there was in Germany during reunification. The Chinese
government addressed this gap by building a non-state sector be-
fore privatizing the state sector. This was both consistent with
prevailing "Chinese socialism" conceptions and with China's
gradualist approach to economic reforms. 145 Perhaps over time
Cuba, as it has done with other aspects of enterprise reform, will
come to imitate this aspect of the Chinese program.
6. CONCLUSION
The efforts in Cuba under the EOP reflect a political structure
that parallels that of China. The reforms instituted are the product
of a strong socialist government that is unwilling to relinquish ei-
ther ideological or operational control over the country's economic
activity, even while recognizing the imperiled state of the econ-
omy.
145 See The Cat That, supra note 69, at 104.
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To what extent Cuba's EOP will exhibit the same deficiencies as
China's program remains to be seen. The characteristics that led to
China's problems are also found in Cuba, primarily the pervasive
government control over the SOE's operations. In any case, Cuba's
program seems to be a viable, albeit limited, first step towards re-
forming its state enterprises and making them more efficient. Im-
proved enterprise operation would, in turn, better position those
enterprises to be successfully sold or otherwise privatized when a
privatization program is set in place in the island.
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